With the advantage of Afghanistan, the U.S. And Allies will be geographically positioned against Iran, Pakistan, and negative forces in the Southwest Asia and in the Middle East.
U.S. And Allied Objectives in Afghanistan
The first objective for U.S. And allied forces in Afghanistan is to eradicate outside and hostile threats to the country’s infrastructure. The threats which currently exist are:
Al Qaeda and Taliban terrorists located mainly on the porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan
Iranian military readiness and proliferation of nuclear armament
These threats might at first be considered minimal in comparison to those threats that exist in Iraq, since Iraq borders with Syria, Iran, and is generally a South Asia-Middle East corridor. Afghanistan, however, bordering Iran and Pakistan, while its threats from Iran, Pakistan, and internal radical insurgent forces cannot be minimized and must be considered seriously, and our objectives for Afghanistan reflect an aggressive and proactive response to militant forces in the country; so too must the threat from Iran be acknowledged and taken seriously.
With the assumption that the threats are taken seriously, it is therefore necessary to station troops along the Afghanistan and Pakistan borders. The troop count must be sufficient to ensure that movement of the enemy between borders is identified, and terminated. The troops must be authorized to operate legally on either side of the border: Pakistan or Afghanistan. This secures the first objective: to secure insurgents operating out of Pakistan against the U.S. military and Afghan government.
The second objective is to secure the north-southwest border with Iran. Troops have to be stationed along this border, without overt access to the Iranian side of the border, but with covert access in order to build military and national security intelligence bases on what Iran’s current abilities are, and to monitor Iran’s ability on a go forward basis. Afghanistan is a good base for operations of this nature.
The third objective is to focus on building an infrastructure in Afghanistan that can support an economy based on Afghanistan’s own resources, and to create new ventures in the country that will support and sustain trade ventures between Afghanistan and other countries.
The fourth objective is to provide support to the government of Afghanistan militarily, economically, and socially with jobs through an improved infrastructure and while building that infrastructure.
Fifth, to eradicate the poppy from Afghanistan’s economic structure by creating other areas of enterprise, teaching improved farming methods and processes, and generally bringing back economic income sources that have long been impaired by continuous war in Afghanistan. Currently, a large number of Afghanis are addicted to heroin and other by products of poppies. While we do not anticipate nor propose that we attempt to address the problem by other than eradicating the poppy; we believe it is in the best long-term interest of the country and in the interest of creating a stable economy, to eradicate the country’s economic and physical dependence on the poppy. We believe that we can bring other venture sources to a higher production level to replace the poppy that will sustain the economy in a more proactive way that is conducive with world trade partnering ventures.
These are the objectives we have for Afghanistan. As you can see, Mr. President, the goals are extensive, but if we are successful along these lines, then we will have a long and permanent relationship with the Afghanistan.
Classified Overview of our New Strategy
From the classified side of considering our objectives in Afghanistan, we will need to have dedicated satellite surveillance of both borders for continuous monitoring, gathering of information, and developing intelligence based on the information gathered. The objective will further be accomplished using unmanned aerial vehicle technologies to accomplish specific area surveillance and bombing of sites identified as extremist strongholds on either side of the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan. This will negate the need for relying on Pakistani nationals to the extent possible, and will prevent U.S. casualties whenever possible, and to the extent possible.
One of the problems with bombing of remote areas has been the Taliban and Al Qaeda’s response to casualties by presenting insurgents without uniforms as civilians to the media. We must counter this by building portfolios that show a lack of individual casualties’ connection to the mountain villages. Intelligence files on the villagers can support our claims that only insurgent extremists were killed in the attacks. So far, the U.S. media has made martyrs of casualties that are known to be insurgents, and the U.S. has not addressed those allegations. When claims that civilians are killed go unaddressed, it forces the Afghanistan Government to make strong statements against the actions, and to issue cautions to the U.S. And Allied forces. It also feeds the negative image of the U.S. As the aggressor without a conscience, and this quickly permeates the thinking of the civilians who might find it to be cause to support the enemy forces. It is time to demonstrate that the casualties are in the service of the insurgent extremist groups at the time when they were killed. The Afghanistan Government is supportive of the U.S. presence there, and whenever they are forced to condemn our presence there because of civilian casualties, it creates difficulty for the government, which is already struggling with waning public support that represents insurgent efforts to discredit it as a puppet government of the U.S.
The U.S. must disseminate positive information about training
Afghanistan’s own military forces, and showing the training as being successful in preparing those forces to protect their country from insurgent forces. We must seek the best looking, most educated, articulate men to focus on as role models and as people of high integrity with only the best interest of serving their country as their focus. We must create a publicity campaign around these individuals, preferably high ranking military men, to show them as family men, honest citizens, and as capable military strategists. They must be able to articulate their own military strengths, but also recognize their own weaknesses, and to be able to help support the need for a continued U.S. presence there until such time as they, as military leaders can be certain that their own forces are trained.
Much has to be done to turn around the idea of the government as corrupt. Part of that can be accomplished with eradicating the poppy and drug industry in the country. However, the government must have a highly visible role in new state projects: roads, bridges, housing, and other areas of infrastructure. It will be up to the American forces on the border where there is the highest insurgent activity to keep those insurgents contained and to prevent them from successfully carrying out missions to undo the progress being made in the country’s infrastructure.
There must be an effort to begin educating the young boys and girls in accordance with the Islamic tradition of keeping them separate — at least for now. Right now, there is a need to focus on making sure that the young children are well taken care of: fed, clothed, and sheltered. We know that the individuals of the Taliban come from the refugee populations of previous wars, and that those children were “grown” in refugee camps inside the Pakistan border where they experienced horrific conditions. Instances have been cited — and we have seen this, too, in the Sudan — where young children are tied to the bodies of their sick and often times demented mothers in order not to lose them. We know, too, that Al Qaeda fundamentalists were able to win the hearts and minds of these young men who grew up in these horrific conditions and manifested their own emotional problems and who were prone to violence by providing them food, clothing, and shelter. We must ensure that the young children of Afghanistan receive these basic essentials, and that they are aware of where those essentials are coming from. We must work to prevent the insurgents from delivering any form of sustenance or assistance to the civilian population in Afghanistan.
The civilians in Afghanistan are the key to achieving our goals for the country. Right now, especially in the remote areas, the civilians are punished by the insurgent forces if they are found to assist or to cooperate with U.S. Or Allied forces. The punishment is severe, including brutal beatings and even death. Homes are destroyed, and the fear of the insurgents is so high that it is difficult to overcome it. There must be a campaign to keep these civilians invested in supporting their government. That, again, goes to maintaining the insurgents in the border region and away from the greater geographical areas of the country.
The presence and visibility of Allied forces must be utilized to demonstrate that the United States is not a rogue nation, and that there is a like mindedness among the countries of the free world in bringing about an end to the need for…